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E N O U G H  A B O U T  
D E L I B E R AT I O N !
In the last few decades, deliberation has 
become a dominant way of thinking about citizen 
participation and the democratization of decision-
making within domains such as scientific research, 
technological and environmental risk, healthcare, 
and public policy. As a corollary, deliberation is 
often believed to increase public participation and 
democracy.
Deliberation is part of a broader transformation 
of democracy that coincides with the emergence 
of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy 
calls for citizens to shape their own opinions 
by educating and informing themselves and by 
exchanging arguments. In this view, deliberative 
democracy promotes dialogue, especially 
between experts and citizens, and claims to 
solve social conflicts and disputes between 
people by reaching consensus and ensuring 
the political legitimacy of decisions. One 
of the most paradigmatic inclinations in 
thinking about deliberation—the practical and 
objectivist tendency—nurtures the idea that 
ethical and democratic issues are entirely 
based in people’s capacities to achieve clear-
cut agreements and make rational decisions 
on the basis of moral reasoning capacities 
and sets of pre-defined moral principles.
Considering this trend, this paper 
suggests shifting attention away from this common 
way of defining deliberation because ethics and 
dialogue are thought of abstractly rather than in 
a situated and practical way. I suggest three shifts: 
from morality to moral vulnerability, from moral 
reasoning to moral imagination, and from justice 
to rightness. To conclude, I suggest that the main 
issue of deliberation is how it nurtures or pacifies 
tensions, disputes, and conflicts within dialogue 
itself.
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FROM MORALITY TO MORAL 
VULNERABILITY
Deliberation is considered to have the ability 
to solve disputes, reach agreements, and make 
decisions while achieving reciprocity, social justice, 
and legitimacy. The ideal behind deliberation is 
indeed to solve social conflicts and ensure fair, 
equal, and reciprocal relations between individuals. 
In order to reach this ideal, one of the most common 
rationales for deliberation is to urge people to 
learn, share, produce, and refer to pre-existing 
morality, that is, sets of justifications, arguments, 
principles, and moral values. According to this view, 
deliberation is thought as a 
process of moral coordination. 
In short, through the 
public exchange of ideas, 
arguments, and justifications, 
individual opinions should 
merge into a single shared 
opinion. The claim is that 
this process has the ability 
to go beyond differences 
in opinions, bargaining, 
personal interests, and 
power relationships. 
In this perspective, 
language and dialogue 
are limited to identifying 
and agreeing on the most 
legitimate and justifiable, 
that is, morally acceptable justifications, arguments, 
principles, or values. This rationality and deliberative 
model require people who can shape their opinions 
and infer a judgment on the basis of abstract 
moral reasoning. The problem with this model, if 
one observes it faithfully, is that it disregards the 
particularities of situations and neglects our moral 
interdependency. Indeed, a large part of our moral 
life is determined by the limits of our individual 
expectations, stances, conceptions, and visions, 
as well as by moments of uncertainty and doubt. 
As humans, all of this makes us morally vulnerable 
beings.
Focusing on moral vulnerability shifts the 
ethical issue from the need to reach well-defined 
agreements that should respect morality to one 
of creating a secure space in which people can 
explore their moral vulnerability to realize what 
truly matters to them and others, and to imagine 
different nuanced, morally acceptable possibilities. 
This requires moving away from the ideal of moral 
reasoning in favor of moral imagination.
FROM MORAL REASONING TO MORAL 
IMAGINATION
In reality, while speaking with each other 
about a situation or a choice, we are sometimes 
able to imagine intermediate 
possibilities and gray zones 
of acceptability that do not 
call for definitive, clear-cut 
decisions. Indeed, within 
dialogue, we can adopt 
an attitude in which the 
focus of attention becomes 
imagining possibilities to 
potentially respond to what 
matters to people in different 
ways. To make this happen, 
we need to let the words 
and experiences of others 
touch us. This creative and 
poietic stance fundamentally 
contrasts with one that 
calls for achieving univocal, 
shared agreement and 
making decisions based on 
abstract moral reasoning capacities. Further, this 
calls for a shift in the ethical issue of deliberation 
from reaching justice to achieving rightness.
FROM JUSTICE TO RIGHTNESS
In recent decades, more and more 
researchers have shown that the theoretical ideal 
of deliberation almost never occurs in reality. For 
instance, during my eighteen months of field work 
at a Swiss acute neurorehabilitation hospital unit 
for people waking from a coma, I never saw people 
make a decision by achieving the theoretical and 
ideal model of deliberation, even when clinical 
discussions concerned ethically sensitive issues, 
such as life and death. Rather, I often observed them 
expressing themselves about the uncertainties 
of diagnoses and prognoses; about the lack of 
For Mansbridge (2015, 27), de-
liberation is a “mutual communication 
that involves weighting and reflecting 
on preferences, values, and interests 
regarding matters of common con-
cern”.
According to Eagan (2016), elib-
erative democracy means that, rather 
than thinking of decisions as the aggre-
gate of citizens’ preferences—as in the 
case of voting—“deliberative democra-
cy claims that citizens should arrive at 
political decisions through reason and 
the collection of competing arguments 
and viewpoints”.
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scientific evidence; and about their difficulties, suffering, fears, doubts, expectations, or preferences. In 
short, people not only address scientific arguments or invoke moral values in order to weigh the pros and 
cons and justify a possible choice. Instead, I saw ethical tensions arising from precarious, fragile clinical 
situations and human beings talking to each other and looking collectively for rightness, all while expressing, 
testing, and sometimes acknowledging the normativity or the vulnerability of their own claims, points of 
view, or visions. Thus, the main ethical issue of dialogue and moments of deliberation lies in the role people’s 
stances and attitudes play in making and unmaking ethical tensions within a gray zone of rightness.
TOWARD A GRAY ZONE OF RIGHTNESS
Moving away from the idea of moral reasoning to focus on moral imagination is an invitation to look 
at the tensions that emerge when people live narrowly, strictly, or tightly within their own experiences, 
conceptions, points of view, and vision. In the clinic, I have observed the difficulty of dealing with different 
perceptions, attitudes, and matters of concern. Hence, I witnessed ethical tensions arising from the fact that 
people did not share or understand what truly matters to them and others. 
Considering this, people’s stances and attitudes often carry with them the possibility of acknowledging 
the multiple acceptable ways of seeing, experiencing, and deciding. This does not mean that people have 
to accept everything or that undoing ethical tensions must become the new, normative moral stance. It 
only means that what is ethical lies in the stances people take toward reality. As a consequence, dialogue 
is important because it carries the possibility of nurturing people’s moral imagination to see multiple human 
ways of understanding what truly matters in a situation.
IN REALITY, WHILE SPEAKING WITH EACH OTHER 
ABOUT A SITUATION OR A CHOICE, WE ARE SOMETIMES 
ABLE TO IMAGINE INTERMEDIATE POSSIBILITIES AND 
GRAY ZONES OF ACCEPTABILITY THAT DO NOT CALL 
FOR DEFINITIVE, CLEAR-CUT DECISIONS.
